taw's blog

Thursday, November 12, 2009

Things I read

As some people expressed interest in RSS feeds I follow, here they are.

For every feed I want to include some recent good item (if there's none, then obviously I should just unsubscribe). Standard fair use disclaimer here (some comics are explicitly CC-*, but most aren't; it's all legit fair use, no matter what Rupert Murdoch thinks).

Webcomics

First, I love webcomics, and there's plenty of those in my feed. Most of them are "one self-contained funny story per item" type, which work very well with RSS readers.

Abstruse Goose is sort of xkcd-ish, crudely drawn smart jokes about science and pop culture, less obsessed with girls than xkcd, and without mouse-over tooltips.

oglaf.com calls itself "Comics. Often dirty.", and is exactly that. Most of it is NSFW, so if you need something to read while sipping a morning coffee in the office, and waking up, it's probably not it. This sample is from quite far back, not because more recent ones weren't good, but because it was hard to find one that was SFW. It's also very nicely drawn, unlike most comics here.

Cyanide & Happiness is an extremely well known comics, strangely with multiple people drawing it, all in more or less the same style. I'll use this opportunity to rant about one infuriating thing about their RSS feed is that very often comics get into RSS feed before they get live on their website (it happened like 4 times just last month).

Order of the Stick is something completely different - instead of being "one funny a day", it actually has a multi-year story of a team of adventurers playing Dungeons&Dragons-inspired campaign and making fun of the rules as they go. Well, at first it was "make fun of D&D vaguely connected strips" format, I think it got significantly worse as it tried to get serious, and most of the humour is about OotS characters, not D&D. Here's one really old strip that you'll get even if you don't follow OotS.

Saturday Morning Breakfast Cereal is another one of those good funny comics - it delivers daily, and has fairly mainstream appeal.

xkcd probably got more cult following than any other webcomics ever. In addition to fans, there are blogs of xkcd hate, and even RSS-able Web 2.0-style website Is xkcd shitty today - their answer always being YES, most often unfairly. It can get really cutesey and sad, or mindlessly evil, or philosophical, or anything else. There are many meciocre xkcds, but it reaches pure comics awesomeness level more often than any other comics I know. And don't forget the mouseover tooltips.

Zero Punctuation isn't really a webcomics - it's a weekly sarcastic video game review. It's universally loved as it tends to find faults in games and make fun of them, while most of the so called "reviewers" just rehash press releases. Here's one old review of one particularly good game:

Reading

All right, I sometimes read and not just look at pretty pictures.

538 is probably the only blog about political polling in existence. It has some highlight, such as predicting results of 2008 American elections much better than anyone else, and finding out that one polling firm was a total fraud, and all their results were fabricated.

It contains a mix of detailed analyses of particular elections (not terribly interesting, unless you happen to live there), criticism of bad polling and bad analysis, and probably most interesting of all - big picture view of shifts in public opinion. Unfortunately it's mostly about USA, and rarely writes about Europe and other places.

Less Wrong is a spin-off of Overcoming Bias, or what Overcoming Bias used to be before becoming Robin Hanson's personal blog. It's filled with insightful posts about human rationality, and biases in thinking, and philosophy of thought. It also has scary amount of discussion that's only understandable to insiders. Some examples:

There's plenty more, and I even sometimes post there.

Marginal Revolution is one of the Freakonomics-style "economics made fun, now with more anecdotes" blogs. It publishes insanely often, five posts a day pace is entirely typical. Unlike this blog, which gets more like five posts a month. A lot of it is reposts of interesting things they found somewhere else, what saves you from following too many feeds. Like repost of this bathroom scales that tweets your weight for all world to see as motivating factor, and experiments with placebo coffee.

Actually 90% of Marginal Revolution is reposts with tl;dr summaries, comments, and counter-arguments. It's pretty good this way. Sometimes they get into crazy libertarian mode, especially when discussing health care, but it doesn't happen that often.

Paul Krugman's blog, and New York Times column (which is like blog, just with longer posts). Krugman can get annoyingly dogmatic about whatever the left wing of Democratic Party believes at time, and often gets horribly "wonkish" about tiny details of macroeconomic analysis. Some good posts:

Krugman can be as bad as dogmatic libertarians, but at least it's bad in the opposite direction. It would be highly amusing if Paul Krugman and Tyler Cowen were locked into one room for a week, and forced to Aumann.

Overcoming Bias used to be Eliezer's blog about rationality, then Eliezer moved to Less Wrong, and Overcoming Bias is all Robin Hanson's. Robin has three big ideas: everything people do is about signaling status, modern medicine doesn't work, and prediction markets are universal solution to every problem. Robin has way too many crazy libertarian moment, so if your libertarian-phobia is stronger than mine do not read. Some good recent posts:

Overview of evidence for panspermia
Estimated 41% of "elections" worldwide are fraudulent (mostly poor countries obviously)
Evidence for flu vaccines is dubious

Peak Oil Debunked used to fight peakoiler doomsdayers during their high days of doom. The doom didn't come, peakoiler movement sort of died, so there are few posts these days, but it was really good back then. Most posts are just facts and figures, something peakoilers hate with passion. (my recent post about geoengineering and its followup were in similar style)

Some nice posts:

Schneier on Security is probably the least controversial of blogs on my reading lists - most of them do politics from time to time, but it's hard to be angry at Schneier about anything. Some good posts:

And the last feed I follow - the War Nerd. Unfortunately it hasn't been posting much since The Decider left. He's way better at predicting course of events on the Middle East than the mainstream media - mostly because mainstream media is just rehashing White House press releases instead of doing any independent thinking. Some good pieces, most pretty old:

Plus countless pieces about Iraq and Afghanistan of course.

Enjoy your reading.

Tuesday, November 10, 2009

Inevitability of geoengineering, part 2

In my previous post, I explained why geoengineering to counteract global warming seems inevitable. To summarize, data suggests that between 2009 and 2050:

World population will increase by about 45%
Poor people are getting a lot richer, average wealth will increase by 200%
This means they will use a lot more energy than now
Neither renewables nor nuclear power seem likely to be able to replace them by 2050, at realistic growth rates
Therefore only plausible source of that energy are fossil fuels, and we already have plenty of examples of countries drastically increasing their fossil fuel use and CO2 emissions extremely quickly.
Reduction in energy use by rich countries is nowhere near big enough to counteract this

What changes around 2050?

World population is expected to more or less flatten out around 2050. We're already adding fewer people each year than during peak growth, so growth is sublinear, let alone expecting it to be exponential. Long term projections need to be taken with a pinch of salt, but it's as safe as it gets to expect much slower growth in second half of 21st century than now.
While world economy will keep growing, average GDP per capita will be more or less where EU levels are now, and energy use past this level doesn't increase that much.
In all likelihood, sources of energy other than fossil fuels will be far better developed than now, so responding to any new energy needs by more renewable energy instead of by more coal power plants, will be much more likely.

Now I don't know exactly when we will have peak CO2 emissions, and at what level - somewhere vaguely around 2050, and at levels twice current seems likely, as decades before it will have much higher pressures to increase fossil fuel use than decades after.

The first problem, is that peak CO2 concentrations will happen long after peak CO2 emissions. Here's a random graph with emissions on the top, and concentrations on the bottom, color-indexed. In all scenarios, including almost immediate halving of emissions, peak is somewhere in 21st century, but CO2 concentrations keep growing long past 2300, peaking hundreds of years from now!!!

Now I don't actually believe CO2 emissions will be falling that slowly - once we figure out how to use renewable energy cheaply, we'll be able to switch almost all our use to it, so peak concentrations will be somewhere during 22nd century.

It gets worse - many effects of CO2 concentrations, like temperature change and ocean acidification, lag it significantly. So peak warming and peak acidification will occur much later than peak concentrations. With 2050 emission peak, and 2150 concentration peak, we might have 2250 climate change effects peak. (last figure completely made up, as it depends on too many details, different effects have different lags, and nobody makes serious estimates that go that far into the future). So even with a lot of optimism about alternatives to fossil fuels, we will have to deal with massive effects of global warming.

This gets us back to geo-engineering. No matter what we do now, short of a genocide and collapse of global economy (world economy grew during the recession, and fell only a few percents in the worst hit countries; this isn't the collapse I'm talking about), our choices are geo-engineering and adapting to higher temperatures.

Disclaimer time

Now disclaimer time. I'm making the common mistake that anthropogenic CO2 emissions are responsible for all global warming. This is not true - added CO2 is only 2/3 of it, the rest being methane, nitrous oxide, CFCs. But there are good news here - their lifetimes in atmosphere are much shorter - while we're talking tens of thousands of years for CO2, it's only 12 years for methane, and about 100 for nitrous oxide and CFCs, so peak concentrations will occur relatively quickly after peak emissions. And in fact, peak concentrations of methane and CO2 seem to have already happened or be happening about now. In longer perspective global warming problem is CO2 problem, with only small methane and nitrous oxide contribution.

The second disclaimer is that there are two kinds of geoengineering - solar radiation management (stratospheric sulphides, cloud seeding, albedo changes and such), and carbon capture and storage.

With solar radiation management we let warming happen, and create equal negative effect.

With CCS we could pull more CO2 from atmosphere than we're emitting. If we went this way peak concentrations might happen much faster after peak emissions than otherwise, and due to rapid fall in concentrations peak warming will be earlier and smaller.

I'm mostly talking about solar radiation management, as we already know how to cool down the planet with current technology and for ridiculously small money; while CCS solutions don't seem to be anywhere near scalable enough soon enough.

Any alternatives like fussion power, nanotech, and new kinds of renewables that people love to talk about won't seriously affect emissions until long after 2050 even in the most optimistic scenarios.

The myth of 5 a day - people never ate that much fruit and veg

NHS (to American readers - it's the British socialized medicine destroying UK, and coming to destroy your country too now) strongly promotes the idea of eating "5 servings of fruit and vegetables" a day, with which I disagree on so many levels.

Here's a quick summary of the alleged benefits, straight from their website:

They're packed with vitamins and minerals.
They can help you to maintain a healthy weight.
They're an excellent source of fibre and antioxidants.
They help reduce the risk of heart disease, stroke and some cancers.
They taste delicious and there's so much variety to choose from.

That's all nonsense.

You are extremely unlikely to have vitamin and mineral deficiency, and if you suspect some (or want to get pregnant, have symptoms of anemia etc.), get real multivitamin pills, or supplements of the right kind. Most fruit and vegetables are fairly unimpressive as for their vitamin contents anyway - for all practical purposes most fruits are just water and sugar, and have been selected this way by farmers, as larger and sweeter fruit sells better, and vitamins don't have taste.
There's absolutely no evidence linking fruit and vegetable consumption to weight - you get stable weight when number of calories taken balances number of calories expended, what's possible on any kind of diet, including a really delicious one based on loads of meat and cheese and chocolate that NHS would not approve of. I'll get back to this point later.
Fibre doesn't do anything - it just passes through your digestive system and goes right into the toilet. "Antioxidants" are one of those terms that make me rage, as they've been stripped from their original scientific meaning, and turned into pure value judgment, and not even of the right value. Your cells know how to deal with oxidative stress already. That's what they're evolved to do over the last 1.7 billion years. They have plenty of ways to do so. And increasing amount of antioxidants will not help your cells. Meta-analysis of all available data shows clearly that eating more of them doesn't do anything for you, and can even be harmful.
There's been no proper long term trials of that kind. There's very few proper long term trials of anything related to diet, and those that are performed invariably show that simple diet advice (eat this, don't eat this) doesn't work - and unless your diet is spectacularly wrong you'll be fine as long as you have adequate exercise, decent portion control, and don't smoke.
As any kid will tell you, fruit and vegetables taste awful - if they were delicious people wouldn't need NHS's bothering about them. Do chocolate and ice cream need NHS campaigns? Obviously not. That's because chocolate and ice cream are tasty, while fruit and vegetables are not, at least not in those ridiculously large amounts.

So it's wrong on all counts. Anyway, that's not what I wanted to post about - I just get distracted easily. Oh, something shiny. Oh, funny cat. I go for all distractions. Now back on track.

What I wanted to talk about was the myth that people used to eat enormous amounts of fruit and vegetables - 5 servings a day or more as NHS advices, and that's it's something modern that they do not do so now. Let's look at FAO data, annual consumption per capita of fruit and vegetables, as far back as it goes (that's unfortunately not that far back). I included some particularly fat countries (USA, Mexico), a particularly healthy country (Japan), random countries from Europe (France, Germany, Poland, UK), and totals for Europe and World. For interest of science I'll say I selected countries and criteria before I had a first look at the data, so it's not a biased selection, but feel free to look at others.

Vegetable consumption, 1961 to 2003, increased in all selected countries:

France - 150kg to 142kg
Germany - 49kg to 90kg
Japan - 95kg to 104kg
Mexico - 25kg to 58kg
Poland - 91kg to 100kg
UK - 60kg to 91kg
USA - 93kg to 123kg
Europe - 90kg to 117kg
World - 63kg to 117kg

Fruit consumption (excluding wine), 1961 to 2003, also increased in all selected countries:

France - 53kg to 95kg
Germany - 79kg to 113kg
Japan - 29kg to 54kg
Mexico - 57kg to 120kg
Poland - 18kg to 47kg
UK - 55kg to 115kg
USA - 76kg to 113kg
Europe - 65kg to 88kg
World - 38kg to 62kg

Fruit and vegetables together, 1961 to 2003:

France - 203kg to 237kg (+17%)
Germany - 128kg to 203kg (+59%)
Japan - 124kg to 158kg (+27%)
Mexico - 82kg to 178kg (+117%)
Poland - 109kg to 147kg (+35%)
UK - 115kg to 205kg (+79%)
USA - 169kg to 236kg (+40%)
Europe - 155kg to 205kg (+32%)
World - 101kg to 179kg (+77%)

So consumption of fruit and veg in the last four decades drastically increased - and so did obesity, heart disease and so on. Increase in UK and Mexico were particularly large - and these are some of the fattest countries in the world, something that was not true in 1961. In increased least in Japan - by far the healthiest of developed countries. NHS was really successful at making Brits eat 5 servings a day - making 63.8% of them overweight in process. So much for fruit and veg consumption helping fight obesity? Here's the list of selected countries ordered by fruit and veg consumption and percentages of overweight people in them:

France - 237kg - 40.1%
USA - 236kg - 74.1%
UK - 205kg - 63.8%
Germany - 203kg - 60.1%
Mexico - 178kg - 68.1%
Japan - 158kg - 22.6%
Poland - 147kg - 47.5%

Is it just me, or do countries that eat more fruit and veg tend to be fatter, not thinner? The answer is probably a lot more like this instead:

And it's not like 1961's fruit and vegetable consumptions were unusually low - they were in fact unusually high by historical standards - normally it was impossible to eat any other than those that grew in your region, in harvest time, what all amounted to very very little compared to what people eat now with globalized industrial agriculture.

The take home message: Ignore NHS; eat chocolate, ice cream, beef, cheese, or whatever else you find delicious. In reasonable amounts.

Thursday, November 05, 2009

Inevitability of geoengineering

I want to write a quick post showing some arguments about inevitability of large scale geoengineering which I find extremely convincing. I'm sure I won't convince that many people, most have made up their minds already.

First, look at list of countries by CO2 emissions. In 2006 global emissions were 28.43 billion tons per 6.55 billion people, or 4.34 ton/person. World population is still growing and is estimated to stabilize at levels around 9.5 billion for 2050-2100, which is the time in question.

Now let's see what would happen if everyone got to current European standards of living, and European CO2 emissions, which are 7.84 tons/person. This would result in CO2 emissions of 74.5 billion tons, or 2.6x times current levels. This number is already quite optimistic - it makes a huge assumption that all countries with higher CO2 emissions like US, Japan, Canada, Australia, Russia etc. scale them down quite considerably.

Now a brief discussion is in order on why numbers like that are relevant. First, I assume that there won't be a massive genocide, or nuclear warfare, or pandemic, or anything else that could drastically reduce population levels. The last time there was a significant reduction in population levels was 1340s. None of the world wars, or any other events even stopped population growth - in fact people tend to reproduce a lot more during times of crisis, than during times of peace and prosperity, so it would need to be the biggest war, pandemic, or other kind of failure in history to significantly reduce population levels. This assumption is probably the safest.

The second assumption is that the rest of the world will grow quite quickly. World GDP/capita is currently $9,774 PPP. EU GDP per capita is $30,513 PPP. If world economy grows at per capita rate of 2.8%, then by 2050 world average GDP will reach current EU levels. This coincidentally is almost exactly annual per capita growth rate of the world economy of the last 30 years. Unlike with population, where predictions are quite solid, here there are more reasons why growth could be significantly slower, or significantly faster than predicted. We just had a completely unexpected global recession for a fairly obvious example. And not so long ago we had massive completely unexpected boom in China and then India, so it can go both unexpectedly badly and unexpectedly well. Still, 2.8% is a pretty decent first estimate.

I want to write a bit more on the subject of economy. Many people are sceptical about the idea that the "poor" countries will ever attain levels of economic development seen in rich countries. But the rich-poor divide is illusory. As you can see yourself with Gapminder, the divide is long gone and most countries are in the middle. World average life expectancy today is higher than in most richest countries in 1950s years ago. World average life expectancy in all but one countries is higher than world average 100 years ago - all that in spite of wars, malnutrition, malaria, HIV, and lack of clean water in many of them! Life in countries considered by many to be "permanently poor" is vastly better than it was in Europe of your grandfathers, and rapidly improving. To think it will somehow suddenly stop is to ignore history.

Development can happen extremely rapidly - world's largest CO2 emitter has been China for a few years now, per capita emissions of which increased by factor of x2.2 between 1990-2006. Likewise for India, growth was x1.6 during that time. Even for big countries not typically associated with rapid growth you have high growth - x4 for Vietnam, x2.4 for Thailand, x2.3 for Malaysia, x1.9 for Indonesia, x1.5 for Pakistan, x1.4 for Brazil and Nigeria and so on (and these are all per capita rates, their total emissions increased far more). Developing countries are catching up fast.

Let's look at past performance of world CO2 emissions. Between 1992-2007, world's emissions increased by 38% - mostly driven by rapidly developing countries like China and India. Even developed countries weren't terribly successful - US and Japan had significant increases in emissions, and EU's stayed pretty much even, and nominally decreased mostly due to early-90s' collapse of heavy industry in former communist member countries. Even if developed countries got their act together and implemented reductions that were agreed on in Kyoto Protocol, they would still be swamped by just Chinese increases, resulting in net emission increases.

And the outlook for the next couple of decades doesn't look terribly promising. Intrade markets, thin as they are (and forgive me lack of links, but their website is virtually unlinkable), think it's extremely unlikely that China and India will agree to any CO2 limits anytime soon, and have pretty low opinion on what reductions developed countries will agree to - chance of agreeing to 10% reduction by 2025 seems to be about even, and there's quite a big difference between agreement and implementation (especially due to possibility of accounting shenanigans of land use changes and such), and such reductions would be swamped by developing countries increase. And in any case the 74.5 billion tons number already assumes that developed countries average will get reduced to current EU levels.

If you hope on peak oil to make 74.5 billion tons/year kind of number impossible, not only peak oil doesn't seem to be happening, coal production grows insanely fast, and estimates of "peak coal" talk about mid 22nd century.

Alternatives to 74.5 billion tons a year

So with business-as-usual, we'll be emitting enough CO2 to get the entire planet stir-fried. What would be alternatives?

First, either outright genocide or indirect genocide by limiting economic growth of developing nations - remember that poverty kills hundreds of millions of innocent people and causes vast suffering. Not only is it unlikely to happen, it would be probably the worst scenario of all.

Second, learn to live in a warmer world. This isn't necessarily going to be as bad. It's hard to imagine anyone who would like to have their children die of malaria and diarrhea just to satisfy some rich smug liberals. People who measure costs of limiting CO2 emissions usually focus on limits in States, or EU - but this is nonsense! Big increases don't come from SUVs, but from bringing poor people to more civilized standards of living, and limiting that would be disastrous. Costs of just taking global warming would be much less than the genocide that would ensue to keep poor people in their place. I think this scenario isn't entirely implausible - there were quite a few cases in history where international cooperation completely collapsed, and in externalities cases like CO2 emissions, this is a possible result.

The third solution, and we're getting somewhere now, would be to sever the link between GDP and CO2 emissions. This is surprisingly hard. Yes, it's trivial to move from Hummer to Prius, but the problem is people who cannot afford either yet, but will want some means of transportation eventually. And they will want electricity - coming from coal most likely. The alternatives look pretty bleak - nuclear power, and large-scale hydroelectricity, both provide only 3% of total primary energy use now (or about 15% of electricity each). All fancy types of renewable energy together don't even add up to 1%. A surprisingly large amount of energy is "traditional biomass", or wood and agricultural waste used for heating and cooking (but then, estimates of it seem to vary wildly). Other than that, right now we're entirely dependent on fossil fuels.

A popular idea of high standards of living without corresponding increase in energy use seems pretty unlikely to me. Yes, we might be able to break the correspondence at some point, but energy use per capita in poor countries is so low, it's simply bound to drastically increase.

Much more promising path is energy generation without fossil fuels. Our best chance so far was with nuclear power. Unfortunately we suddenly stopped what looked like extremely rapid exponential growth in late 1980s after Chernobyl disaster - estimated 4000 people will die due to increased radiation exposure (much higher estimates based on linear no-threshold model can be safely ignored, as LNT model is known to be empirically completely wrong).

By ridiculously naive estimations, if this growth continued exponentially as it seemed to have up to Chernobyl, nuclear energy would provide around 20% of total energy production today, or half of all oil could be eliminated. Now this kind of extrapolation is ridiculously naive, but you should give it some thought.

So could we switch to nuclear at ridiculously rapid pace? We would need over 50 times as much nuclear capacity to generate enough energy to cover increased energy use by 2050, what seems ridiculously optimistic by any standards, not to mention nuclear proliferation issues. It looks somewhat less ridiculous when expressed as 10% a year growth (or doubling every 7 years like pre-Chernobyl), but it's just not going to happen.

There aren't that many renewable options. Current global energy consumption is 15 TW, and it will be about 39TW by 2050 by extrapolation. The only large scale renewable energy source we use, hydroelectricity, is nowhere close to our needs, and neither is geothermal really, if we look at what small fraction of it we can practically extract thanks to high local concentrations. We're left with just two then - wind, and solar. We would need to use 5% of all wind energy of Earth to fill the energy gap.

In 2008 wind power had 121GW of installed peak "capacity", and produced 260 TWh of energy (what corresponds to 30GW of actual production). It would require order of 1000x increase in wind power, or 19% a year growth, to make it fill the energy gap. And the actual growth is actually fast enough at 29% in 2008. But there are clear diminishing returns here - best locations will be taken, and massive subsidies cannot really scale to TW levels.

The other alternative is solar power. Just Earth-based solar is so plentiful that using even 0.02% of solar power now, or 0.045% of it in 2050, we can replace all of world's energy use. And it doesn't stop there, with space-based solar we can get numbers many many orders of magnitude larger. It would sort of need a space elevator, but we might get there by 2200.

Anyway, while solar is undoubtedly our long term future, it doesn't look that bright in the short term. There's only 15GW of solar thermal installed, and mere 0.6GW of solar thermal. And these are capacity numbers. We're talking x10,000 increase to cover the energy gap, or 25% a year increase, or x200,000, 35% per year for solar thermal. Now these numbers are actually what we see now, but as I said for wind, these are all based on massive subsidies, and there's no evidence that they're scalable to TW range at all.

By the way all this is based on assumptions that all energy is basically equal, and all greenhouse gas emissions is energy production. Neither of these are true - electricity is relatively easy to replace with renewables, at least if we ignore their intermittent character, but transportation much less so. And even with 100% solar electricity-based economy, there would still be some significant sources of greenhouse gases like methane from agriculture - so whatever we estimate here is bound to be overly optimistic.

With all this said, thanks to better energy efficiency, and widespread use of renewables, it's quite likely that humanity energy use by 2050 will be much lower than baseline number of 74.5 billion tons a year. On the other hand expecting it to be vastly lower than current emissions is just extremely unlikely.

And here comes the final solution - without genocides, without unexpected revolution in either nuclear power or renewables, we will have much more CO2 in atmosphere in 2050 than now. And due to massive lag it has, it will keep warming Earth for a very long time after we finally get our emissions to decrease. So if we cannot agree to live in warmer world, we have to geo-engineer to survive the next century without massive and irreversible environmental change.

Nature did some real life large scale geoengineering testing for us, and it works without major side effects (you probably haven't even noticed the experiment in 1991). Economic estimations put it in ridiculously cheap range - some schemes are estimated to cost just 375 million dollar a year, or just 17,000 Toyota Priuses (seems like a highly relevant unit of measurement) - for comparison replacing every American car with a Prius would cost 5 trillion USD, and it would still do very little towards limiting global CO2 emissions. And stratospheric sulphur isn't the only solution, just the one we have best data on (by the way it's not about polluting more, only about moving less than 1% of existing pollution to higher layers of atmosphere).

So the alternatives are:

Outright genocide
Indirect genocide by forced poverty
Accepting the warming
Increase in nuclear or renewable energy far beyond anything that can be realistically expected in this timeframe
Geoengineering

Guess which one is the least bad?

Now I just need to blog on abortion, and I win blogging controversy bingo.

Sunday, November 01, 2009

Why Malthusianism refuses to die

It's astonishing how popular Malthusian catastrophism is, in spite of such spectacular evidence to the contrary. As disaster keeps failing to come, its details are changed, but the core prediction that we're all doomed doesn't budge. In this post I'd like to explore some evidence against Malthusian ideology - as with so much evidence to the contrary, it like creationism long ceased to be anything else than ideological view.

Classical Malthusianism

But first, let's say what I'm criticizing. Malthus' idea was that population growth is exponential, while food production growth is arithmetic, therefore we're all going to fall back into extreme poverty due to overpopulation, until we're poor enough to be dying in sufficient numbers to counteract that.

The second part is, and I'm not making this up - "therefore, we should starve and abuse people who lost their jobs in a recession to lower taxes on the rich". That's a forerunner of the Real Business Cycle theory if there ever was one. The predictable result of being tough on the poor was that the working poor were starved to the point of eating pig fertilizer, beaten, and sexually abused.

But that's not the worst of Malthus-inspired politicians - they decided to starve one million poor people in Ireland. During the alleged "famine", Ireland was a major exporter of food, with its food production even at lowest point estimated to be enough to sustain population twice as high as it had. And there was well known solution to such famines already tried in 1782–83 of temporarily stopping food exports, but those good Malthusians would rather have a bit of a genocide than to stand in ways of profits.

Anyway, I'm not here to criticize consequences of Malthus' ideology, just its factual basis. It's been 211 years since Malthus' infamous essay, how far behind are we in food production?

Oh wait, actually food production looks pretty exponential on this graph, while population growth looks rather linear. It's not even that - according to virtually all projections population growth is slower than linear, and world populations are due to stabilize fairly soon, here's Wikipedia:

Unfortunately I haven't found any useful food production statistics going all the way back to 18th century, but by now it should be very clear that these relationships do not hold.

Yet, Malthusianism refuses to die. The most popular mid 20th century's neo-Malthusian Paul Ehrlich famously wrote in 1968:

The battle to feed all of humanity is over. In the 1970s and 1980s hundreds of millions of people will starve to death in spite of any crash programs embarked upon now. At this late date nothing can prevent a substantial increase in the world death rate...

Or more specifically - "I have yet to meet anyone familiar with the situation who thinks India will be self-sufficient in food by 1971" and "India couldn't possibly feed two hundred million more people by 1980."

That was in the middle of yield increases so spectacular they caused major difficulties to even harvest it all (High yields led to a shortage of various utilities — labor to harvest the crops, bullock carts to haul it to the threshing floor, jute bags, trucks, rail cars, and grain storage facilities. Some local governments were forced to close school buildings temporarily to use them for grain storage. as Wikipedia says). India became net exporter of cereals by 1978.

You'd think that after two centuries of predictive failures people would have given up, but no. The latest neo-Malthusian fad just a few years ago was "peak oil". It sort of fizzled since, but in case you forgot, here's an awesome YouTube video describing peakoilnik ideology while dancing:

"There won't be much food anyway, as oil is used to make fertilizers and pesticides. Up to two thirds of the world population may not make it. Four billion people may not survive."

Because as they say, we're basically "eating oil" as the meme says. It doesn't bother them much that oil is used at no step of fertilizer production - it's all natural gas, and entire 3-5% of world natural gas (1-2% of world energy use) is spent on fertilizer production (not even as energy source, more as convenient hydrogen source easier than electrolysis of water), but alternatives based on coal, and hydroelectricity are well known and used depending on local availability. China already produces most of its fertilizer with coal. The first commercial hydroelectricity-based fertilizer plant was opened in 1905, over a century ago, and in case you're wondering use of electric plowing equipment dates to late 19th century.

Pesticide production is so ridiculously low, by some back of an envelope estimates takes about 0.06% of world's oil, and is trivially replaceable by coal if need be (I know of no serious estimates, as it's too small to bother anyone with a clue).

What a Malthusian world would look like

So why so many people believe in Malthusian-inspired catastrophism? I have a two-fold hypothesis. First, some people just enjoy beliefs that we're all going to die. It seems that virtually every disaster scenario, no matter how plausible or not - attracts countless believers.

But there are people smarter than that who still believe in Malthusianism. Here's the second part of my hypothesis. When people look at history, to see if it matches some theory, they just look at things that would be observable if theory was true, and see if there are present. They don't do proper Bayesian updating.

Here's a simple example - let's say you have a theory which says that clash of civilization causes warfare. Then the naive thing to do would be to look at history, note a few wars between civilizations, and take it as evidence for the theory. It would also be wrong, as far more numerous wars were fought within civilizations, and proper Bayesian thinking must look at both.

So let's take a look at evidence for Malthusian worldview against the null hypothesis that food production is just like any other commodity, and not any more connected to population than production of clothes, bricks, or paper.

If Malthusianism was true, food production per capita would be pretty much constant - because any increase in food production would result in increase in population, and decrease in food production would cause mass starvation, and adjust population accordingly. But if Malthusianism was false, food production per capita would also be pretty much constant, because what would be the point of growing more food if there was nobody to eat it? So there's no evidence either way.

If Malthusianism was true, everyone would be poor. Not only is this ridiculously false, now, historical estimates of life expectancies vary wildly from 18 to 60 for the same time period.

Malthusianism predicts almost all food production would be in whatever generates highest number of calories per hectare. Non-Malthusianism predicts food production would be much more varied - and it is so. Just the fact that we're keeping farm animals, which by their nature only destroy and not produce nutrients, proves Malthusianism wrong. There might be exceptions, but most grazing lands would produce more calories when cultivated, not to mention Malthusian ridiculousness of feeding animals human food as we do.

If Malthusianism was true, any sudden decrease in population, due to wars, famines and such, would result in rapid rebound, as agricultural capacity existed to support much larger populations, proven by its previous existence. If Malthusianism was false, population would have no particular reason to rebound. Here the evidence is very clear - there are numerous example of major population loses which were not recovered for centuries. Two best examples affect entire Europe, which used to have high populations at height of Roman empire, then fell to very low levels and didn't recover until 12-13th centuries, almost a millennium later. Second fall was due to Black Death, recovery from which wasn't complete even two centuries later.

Malthusianism predicts that it would be extremely unlikely for vast amount of spare arable land to exist - yet this was exactly the situation for centuries in early Medieval Europe, with vast tracks of unused lands.

Malthusianism predicts that famines would happen during times of higher population a lot, while almost never happening during time of low population. But even a brief look at Wikipedia's List of famines shows plenty of major famines both during population lows of early middle ages (5th century famines in Western Europe, 750's famine in Spain, 809 famine in Frankish Empire, 963-964 in Ireland, 1005 in England, 1016 all Europe, 1030-1032 France, 1066 England again, 1097 France again). There were supposedly 95 famines on British Isles alone during Middle Ages. In spite of very low population levels, we can see plenty of them, and we'd probably know about more if it wasn't for horrible Medieval record keeping. Notice that during all that time there was plenty of undeveloped arable land!

During second period of low populations after Black Death, there are major famines 1390 in England, 1481-1483 in France, 1504 in Spain, 1518 in Venice and so on. I'm not even going to mention that modern periods of European population explosion had fewer famines than any other time in history.

Non-Malthusian view correctly predicts that famines and population levels are completely uncorrelated. Famines are caused not by the mythical "overpopulation", but commonly by wars, government action (like in Ireland, and 1930s' Ukraine, notice how democratic governments have virtually spotless track record of no famines, in spite of plenty of agricultural disasters), and most of all - simply by major delay between increase in agricultural inputs and outputs. It doesn't matter that there's plenty of unused land around, developing it would take years, and plenty of labour, capital, seed, and farm animal input, before any food was grown on it - all of which being in short supply during famine anyway. By the time food was growing the famine would be long over. To give you some indications of time scales involved, settlers in new developments were freed from any taxation for up to 24 years. During that time net effect on food production would be negative.

Most of all, current overwhelming explosion of wealth is completely and utterly incompatible with Malthusianism. Even the second worst country in the world - Angola - has life expectancies far greater than world had 100 years ago (one tiny country which doesn't has 26.1% HIV infection rates, and is too poor to afford HIV drugs - hardly a Malthusian reason). In spite, or maybe even due to, population explonion, world's average life expectancy is 66.57 now. This is level not reached by even the richest countries before 1930, and by most developed countries well into 1940s an 1950s.

However hard I try, I cannot find any evidence for even very broadly constructed Malthusianism that cannot be explained as well or better by treating food as a normal commodity. So worry not - we're not doomed.

Widespread capital punishment never existed

There's this fancy Western European idea of abolishing death penalty. Wikipedia even has a nice map, with blue countries having abolished death penalty entirely, red still carrying it out, and green/orange having it on the books, but not in practice.
But reality is different than that. Most of the red countries almost never carry out the death penalty, reserving it for extremely unusual cases - in 2008 estimated 5727 people were executed, over 80% of them in mainland China, other than that only Iran and Saudi Arabia doing three-digit numbers. Other big red countries like India, USA, Indonesia, Pakistan, Japan and so on very rarely execute people.

As 59 million people die every year, your chance of getting executed is like 1:10,000, or more like 1:200,000 if you don't like in relatively execution-happy China, Iran, or Saudi Arabia.

Numbers like this are ridiculously uncommon - about 100 people die every year from peanut allergy in just United States. And "accidental suffocation and strangulation in bed", which sounds like a codeword for "BDSM gone awry" causes 327 deaths annually in just USA.

It's not just due to lack of crime - annually, half million homicides take place, and many countries have or had death penalty for lesser things. So if you're a killer, the chance of getting a lethal injection for it are 80:1 (assuming they get the right person), or more like 1500:1 unless you live in one of the three aforementioned countries.

Add to that the usual overconfidence criminals have, and it's clear that fear of death penalty is the least of criminals' concerns. Especially since even in United States you're over three times as likely to die as a result of a shootout with the police than due to legal execution, so we're talking at most 30% extra deaths factor here. The idea that people will stop carrying out crime due to fear of capital punishment is just highly dubious.

History lesson

So is this it? Did the abolitionists win? Not necessarily. Googling indicates that capital punishment for crime was never particularly widespread. Yes, governments killed loads of people - massacres during wars and occupations, killing political opponents, summary executions to quell social unrest, and some such. But legal capital punishment of citizen committing ordinary crimes after proper judicial process? Very unlikely.

Here's some statistics. Stalin killed about 60 million people, and Hitler about 20 million (estimates vary considerably, but let's take those numbers). How many actually received death penalties? Only 40 thousand from Nazis (1 in 500), and 750 thousands from Soviets (1 in 80). And these were mostly political opponents, war and civil war cases and such - not proper criminals.

How about other countries? Czarist Russia averaged less than 60 a year, and remember that many of them were political cases. Between 1770 and 1830 England had allegedly bloodiest criminal code on Earth, with death punishment for "writing a threatening letter", hanging out with gypsies, or "strong evidence of malice" and over 200 other crimes, while still averaging barely above 110 executions annually. Even the infamous Spanish Inquisition barely managed 20 burnings a year (but then, these were mostly religious and political opponents not criminals, so maybe they shouldn't be included here).

It's just really difficult to find any government, that routinely carried out large number of legal executions of criminals during time of peace.

When governments kill

That's not to say governments don't kill. But these killings rarely affect common criminals. Nazis killed people for being of wrong ethnic group. Soviets killed people for being of wrong social class, or just because. The same 18th century United Kingdom which was so cautious with criminals of right ethnicity, killed million people for being poor and Irish (and no, it wasn't any Malthusian bullshit, Ireland was a major food exporter even during this politically caused famine).

Even countries which don't execute criminals at all like Denmark with no executions since 1892, change their mind during and briefly after war time, when 54 people were executed (it's not really a legal capital punishment, as it's all ex post facto). Likewise in Finland, after not executing anyone since 1825, about 550 people were killed during war time (unlike Denmark where it was mostly proper war criminals and people supporting Nazis, here you could get a firing squad for conscientious objection, and without even a real trial).

What does it mean for capital punishment debate?

Other than perhaps in mainland China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, the debate is purely speculative now. There is virtually no capital punishment anywhere. And other than during wars, occupations, major civil unrests and alikes, it was extremely rare for many centuries. Before that, executions might or might not have been more frequent, but it's hard to talk about proper legal proceedings, so they don't count.

People who support death penalty have a big problem, as there won't be any statistics showing serious effects of widespread application of it during time of peace, as it never happened. There are some bullshit statistics, like those in the original Freakonomics book (very entertaining book, by the way), but due to vast non-random annual variations in number of homicides and executions, we're talking about effects of a rounding error, and social science just cannot do anything useful with them.

So it's mostly about what makes you feel better. If you're a real Christian, then you should follow Jesus and be against death penalty. If you're a fake Christian like Southern Baptist, you should support death penalty because you hate black people more than you love Jesus. And if you're an atheist, do whatever you want, it's not like I can convince you.

Here, I solved it for you.

Wednesday, October 28, 2009

Medieval 2 Total War Concentrated Vanilla 0.07

Here's another release of my Medieval 2 Total War Concentrated Vanilla mod.

Old releases suffered from the too-much-money problem, just like the pre-crash Goldman Sachs, so I decided to scale it down a bit. Instead I introduced massive free garrisons.

Here's the full list of changes relative to vanilla:

For more dynamic game, all units move 75% faster on strategic map.
One big problem with vanilla was that money didn't matter. No matter if you had a lot or not, there wasn't all that much to spend it on. So now all buildings take 1 turn to build, but are 50% more expensive. This drastically increases importance of money.
To add some strategic richness, mines give 2x the profits, and cost 3x as much (x2, +50% like all other buildings). Some settlements with rich mines like Zagreb or Vienna are worth a lot, maybe even worth starting a war over.
There used to be 50% increase in settlement and merchant trade, and mine profits used to be 3x, but this was a serious overkill. If you manage well, settlements and merchants will give you more money than in vanilla as you can build relevant buildings faster.
There also no longer double population growth penalty/bonus for tax rates - it was an overkill.
To help small nations, King's Purse increased 2x (that is - free money a nation gets unrelated to its settlements - from 1500-2500/turn to 3000-5000/turn).
To reduce annoyance with rebels, rebel and pirate spawn rates reduced 10x. (I'm not actually sure if it reduced them as much as the file says it would, but it feels more or less right now).
Cavalry, especially heavy cavalry was seriously overpowered. Small groups of knights could easily crush infantry armies ten times their budget, so infantry was useless other than free militias to patrol cities, and cheap grunts to operate siege equipment. Because with cavalry-centric warfare missile units are useless, this limited army composition even further - and destroyed rich tactical variety that M2TW could possibly have. So all cavalry is now 50% more expensive to recruit and upkeep. Cavalry is still extremely powerful when used right, except now other kinds of armies are useful too.
Bodyguards were particularly overpowered - in early periods they simply destroyed everything, were numerous, self-healing, essentially free (you get new candidates for adoption if you lose old generals all the time), and as every faction has identical bodyguards they severely reduced tactical richness of the game. So bodyguards units are the half size now (upkeep cost is proportional to unit size, and they're cavalry, so mod's bodyguard unit costs 75% of vanilla's). Old versions of the mod reduced their hitpoints from 2 to 1, but it no longer happens, as this made bodyguards overnerfed in late periods. Unfortunately there no way to get the balance right - as bodyguards stay the same, but other units massively improve, either bodyguards will be too strong early on, or too weak late on. I moved the balance point somewhat towards the weakening.
Vanilla sieges are ridiculously easy, with a single unit of ballistae being able to take down large stone walls. This made sieges was too easy, and as a consequence turned the game into a siegefest. So now gates and walls (but not towers) are 5x stronger. Serious artillery will be needed to take anything but the weakest walls.
Towers now have 2x fire rate for normal ammo, and 1x fire rate for flaming ammo. Increasing flaming ammo rate too much as old versions did made siege equipment like siege towers almost useless. But high normal fire rate should help defenders a lot, even for undermanned settlements that AI leaves. This wouldn't be necessary if AI was competent, but we know well it's not, and leaves valuable settlements defended by one unit of Peasants far too often. This balances AI stupidity considerably, and also frees the player to play more strategically by making defense easier (this is not as essential as in old versions of the mod due to increased free garrisons).
Tower activation range is 8x larger (a bit of reversal to Rome Total War). So you cannot shut down towers just by scaring off defenders with some arrows like in vanilla. Strong walls, and massive towers' firepower together mean sieges will be very difficult. Prepare a lot of artillery, or spies, or massively overwhelming force that can take severe loses before giving up. I'm yet to take a well-manned Fortress in this mod (but then AI often mans its settlements insufficiently, and there are other options like waiting their food supplies out, or provoking a sally).
For consistency with making sieges harder, spies cost 2x to recruit and upkeep. And AI is quite competent at counter-espionage operations, so spy flood doesn't work all that often.
To help defenders in sieges, missile infantry ammo increased 2x. It very rarely affects field battles, as in those they rarely get to expend even half of their ammo.
A big change is doubling free garrison in cities. Village 0, Town 4, Large Town 6, Small City 8, Large City 10, Huge City 12.
The biggest change is introducing free garrison in castles. Motte&Bailey 1, Wooden Castle 2, Castle 4, Fortress 7, Citadel 12. In vanilla castles are either left barely defended, or are massive bleeding money hole - failure both ways.
Just like with cities, castles' basic infantry units can be free garrison, but not cavalry or expensive infantry. Basic infantry is one with morale up to 5, and cost up to 155. So Peasants up to Armored Sergeants, and Peasant Archers up to Genoese Crossbowmen, Venetian Archers, and Hand Gunners can all be free when garrisoned. On the other hand Dismounted Knights of all kinds, and most faction-specific elite units cannot. I guess it might introduce some faction unfairness, but I can live with it.

Overall, what you get is much tactically and strategically richer game, with a lot larger differences between factions, but one that still feels a lot like vanilla Medieval 2 Total War. In the mod defense is easy, so you don't have to mindlessly attack everyone.

The main problem left is the spectacularly stupid AI, about which I cannot really do that much.

I also did some other experiments, that didn't get to the mod:

Making ocean-traveling ships available from the beginning (well, as soon as you can build sufficient port infrastructure) enables fights with natives. But Americas are disconnected from the mainland Europe, and it doesn't really feel like it's part of the same game. Try it once to see what fighting Aztecs is like, then forget they're even part of the game.
Making Mongols (or maybe even Timurids) come earlier. It's a lot more fun to fight Mongols, but then if they come very early, they will totally crush AI on auto-resolve. Unfortunately auto-resolve favours stronger armies too much, so they won't even suffer too much loses, and you'll have to deal with them yourself. One full stack of Pavise Crossbowmen and Feudal Knights led by semi-decent General (or equivalent) can defeat one full Mongol stack without that much trouble in field, and well defended settlement with ballista towers completely destroys them. It's another thing to try once. I haven't fought Timurids yet.
Making Gunpowder available immediately unfortunately counters the effects of very strong walls, and yet good gunpowder infantry and cavalry won't be available until much later. I'm not even sure if gunpowder units are better than plain Pavise Crossbowmen, they don't seem to be from the stats, and I never had an opportunity to play much with them.

Anyway, download the mod here.

Blog posts about previous releases: 0.02, 0.04, 0.06.

Thursday, October 15, 2009

Folk Complexity Theory

There's one kind of posts on this blog that get the most hostile reactions. It's not politics (nobody reads those), flaming programming languages, or computer games - the most controversial subject is Big O analysis! Here are relevant posts:

Basically I claim that Big O is useless in most practical situations. And I get flamed a lot. At first I tried to explain to the flamers how they are mistaken, then I basically ignored them after explanations proven to be pointless, but now I see that it's all just big misunderstanding. What I call Big O analysis is a fairly precise construct of computer science. But that's not how most people use the Big O notation - they follow Folk Complexity Theory, which I want to describe here.

The Official Complexity Theory

First, here's a brief repetition of Algorithms and Data Structures 201, or whatever your course explaining this was.

An algorithm is O(f(n)) if in a particular model of computations, if there exist some constants n₀, and c, such that for all input lengths greater than n, computation time is less than c × f(n). A problem is O(f(n)) if in particular model of computations there exists a O(f(n)) algorithm that solves it.

Models of computations are things like different varieties of Random access machine, and different models usually only differ by some logarithmic factors. Sometimes you want to assume that adding two numbers takes constant time, sometimes that it takes time proportional to logarithm of their sum, and details like that. If you disregard logarithmic factors, you don't have to be all that precise about which variety of RAM you're using. That's about it.

In particular, if the problem is only defined for constant-sized input, then by definition it has complexity O(1). There exists some c, such that for all possible sizes, running time of the algorithm is less that c × 1.

So breaking AES-128 is O(1). As is breaking RSA-4096. Breaking RSA-n for arbitrary n isn't, but that's entirely unrelated problem. Breaking AES-n is meaningless concept, as AES isn't defined for arbitrary n.

In particular classes like P, and NP, don't depend much on what reasonable computation model you're using. They're defined on Deterministic Turing Machines for reference (which is polynomial factor slower than RAM), but if something is P on DTM, it's P on RAM and vice versa.

How cryptography handles it

As I got a lot of flames about my claim that breaking RSA-4096 is O(1), let me explain how cryptography handles it. So cryptography doesn't use Big O notation much.

Security is measured in bits - a cryptosystem has k bits of security if the attacker must perform 2^k times as many operations as legitimate user to defeat security of the cipher. For some types of security key size and security are related - for block ciphers security = key size, for hash collisions security = key size/2. For public key cryptography these bit measures can be only approximately specified in terms of key size, and whatever formula we have we're completely uninterested in its asymptotic form, as all feasible key sizes are small, and constant factors are of great interest to us.

The Folk Complexity Theory

And now the main subject of the post - The Folk Complexity Theory. When people say some algorithm is O(f(n)), they actually mean that for "normal" sizes of inputs, on actual computers, it's expected running time is between two "small" constants times f(n) times reasonable number of log(n) factors as long as they don't push the constant too high.

O is used sort of like Θ of the official theory. Folk O(n) algorithm is not considered to be O(n²).
So bubble sort is O(n²), as number of operation tends to be something like 10n². Logarithmic factor for addressing and arithmetic is not considered at all.
Merge sort is O(n×log(n)), as number of operation tends to be something like 10n×log(n). Notice how log factor for number of operations is included here as it's significantly higher than allowed small constants; but log factor for cost of addressing and arithmetic is not, as on normal computers it's constant up to 2³², which is very big n. And only doubles for 2⁶⁴, which is too ridiculously high n to bother. Exactly the same reasoning can be used for both log factors, so this is highly peculiar.
Quick sort is O(n×log(n)), the Folk Complexity Theory always deals with typical case, not worst case.
Breaking AES-128 is O(2ⁿ) because the constant is too big to be allowed. It doesn't matter that there's no n here, and AES is not defined for other key sizes. The problem must be reformulated to have n, no matter if it makes any sense or not. Number of operation like 2¹⁴⁰ is simply "not allowed", while 2¹²×2ⁿ is.
Breaking RSA-4096 is likewise O(2ⁿ), even though there's no n here at all.
Forging signature of n-byte message signed with RSA-4096 is, uhm... O(2ⁿ). Wait, n is already something else... O(2^k) then maybe? The problem is reformulated as RSA-k because large constants are not allowed, and usually there's no point saying O(2^k+n), as n is too small to matter for all practical n.
As an added bonus "NP" usually means Θ(2ⁿ), for real or imagined n. This is spectacularly incorrect (most problems are not decision problems; there can be no Θ bounds even for NP-complete problems until NP != P is proven, and every P problem is NP), but doesn't cause much confusion in practice.

This is the source of all confusion - I was talking about the Official Complexity Theory, while most Redditors interpreted it as Folk Complexity Theory statements, in which they were obviously untrue.

Is Folk Complexity Theory useful?

It's quite amusing that so many people flame me for saying the Official Complexity Theory is overrated, and don't even know it. But I'm not going to blame them - who needs it once they're past exams anyway? In practice Folk Complexity Theory is actually better heuristic than the Official kind. We program real computers. On real input sizes. ceil(log₂(n)) factors shouldn't be ignored, but ceil(log_4294967296(n)) factors which represent cost of arithmetic and addressing on most 32-bit computers hardware totally can and should. And so should all log(log(n)), which nobody ever bother with past exams.

The Folk Complexity Theory has weird status - it's neither mathematics like the Official theory, nor practice like actual benchmarking. It's just a bunch of heuristics dressed as something much more formal than they are. Often even fairly useful heuristics. Just nothing more than that, and not worth the flames.

The Web 2.0 of Metaphors

After hearing that something is Wikipedia of whatever it is about, and getting slightly annoyed by it, I decided, in interest of science, to compile popularity ranking of "the X of Y" metaphors, by Google counting.

I found quite a few false positives, like "the livejournal of Nikki", and "the Linux of your choice", but upholding the glorious scientific tradition of ignoring every methodological issue that cannot be fixed, I completely disregarded them.

"the windows of" - 15,100,000
"the internet of" - 7,790,000
"the apple of" - 6,470,000
"the google of" - 3,160,000
"the youtube of" - 766,000
"the microsoft of" - 397,000
"the imdb of" - 307,000
"the craigslist of" - 303,000
"the livejournal of" - 290,000
"the ebay of" - 277,000
"the amazon of" - 262,000
"the facebook of" - 237,000
"the myspace of" - 235,000
"the linux of" - 197,000
"the wikipedia of" - 180,000
"the yahoo of" - 142,000
"the flickr of" - 124,000
"the ibm of" - 109,000
"the blogspot of" - 108,000
"the web 2.0 of" - 92,900
"the bing of" - 90,900
"the firefox of" - 63,200
"the aol of" - 63,100
"the napster of" - 61,200
"the msn of" - 52,100
"the digg of" - 23,600

It seems the most popular activity is explaining one web service as metaphor of another:

Is Craigslist the "Napster" of the Sex Industry
YouTube Redesign: Becoming the Google of Video?
Is Facebook: the Google of Social Networks
Google Earth Is the AOL of the Geoweb
MySpace is the AOL of Social Media/Web 2.0
YouTube.com — the Flickr of Video

There are also some unusual finds:

The Wikipedia of Slutty Dressing
The Craigslist of Antibiotic Resistance
Is Python the Apple of Programming Languages?

Another interesting find is that while I've been expecting a lot of "the X of sex", only Wikipedia (36,200) and Facebook (29,500) have decent number of matches.

"The X of porn" is a lot more popular, here Google (378,000), YouTube (354,000), and surprisingly Napster (22,200) are taking the lead.

The other most popular Internet activity, spam, got almost no hits.